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ABSTRACT
Taylor's model of staggered wage setting is reformulated in terms of
anticipated relative real wages rather than re1at~ve money wages. The relative
real wage (RRW) model exhibits more nominal inertia thim.the relative money
wage (RMW) model in the' following sense. With N-period contracts the RRW
model yields a 2N-2 order stochastic difference equation in the contract wage
while Taylor's RMW model yields an N-1 equation. Unlike the RMW model the lag
coefficients need not all have a common sign. It is a1sa shown that Taylor's
money wage model with relative wage effects is observationally equivalent to
a real wage model without relative wage effects. Taylor's conclusion that
rational expectations combined with nominal inertia (due e.g., to overlapping,
staggered, non-contingent money wage contracts) leave scope for known contingent
monetary policy rules to influence such real variables as the variance of real









In a number of influential recent papers Taylor (1979a, bi 1980a,b) has
analysed the behaviour of an economy characterized by staggered overlapping
wage contracts and rational expectations. His model has "Keynesian" features.
In particular, the distribution function of real output is not invariant under
alternative deterministic (and known) monetary policy rules. A sufficient
reason for this is the inertia in the money wage process induced by the
staggered contracts. One of the aims of our paper is to demonstrate that this
is sufficient by removing what may be considered a form of money illusion from
Taylor's model. In that model, wage bargainers are influenced by relative
money wages rather than relative real wages. Money wage contracts are negotiated
without reference to past, current and expected future prices. Our paper
modifies Taylor's model to render it immune to the money illusion criticism.
The suggested modification does not eliminate the Keynesian qualities of the
model. It does, however, have interesting implications for the empirical
estimation of models with staggered wage contracts (see especially Taylor, 1980b).
Section 2 presents our general N-period overlapping staggered real wage
model or relative real wage model (RRW) and contrasts it with Taylor's relative
money wage model (RMW). Section 3 contains some explicit numerical solutions of
the RRW model which are then compared with the solutions of the corresponding
RMW models. One can distinguish three influences on the contract wage. These are
the average price level expected to prevail over the contract, demand effects
and the response of bargainers to relative (real or nominal) wages. Taylor's
model contains the demand effect and the relative nominal wage effect. Section 4
analyses staggered real and money wage contracts without relative wage effects.- 2 -
One conclusion is that Taylor's RMW model is observationally equivalent to a
staggered real wage model without relative wage effects. Section 5 considers
some empirical implications of the RRW model.
2. A comparison of the general solution of Taylor's relative money wage model
and the relative real wage model
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The logarithm of the money contract wage negotiated in period t is denoted
by xt • Wage contracts last N periods. Aconstant fraction ~ of all firms and
all workers settle in any given period. The contract wage is constant over
the duration of the contract. We shall assume in this section, along with
Taylor (1980a), that the weights on future and past contract wages are symmetric,
linearly declining in s and sum to unity, i.e.
d = d = b = [NCN-llflcN- s) s -s s
s =1, ... , N-l (5)
Yt' the log of real output is also a measure of excess demand in the labour- 3 -
market, since the level of full employment output is assumed to be constant
throughout. Pt and mt are the logs of the price level and the nominal money
stock respectively. The terms Et and vt are white noise disturbances with
zero means and a constant contemporaneous variance-covariance ~atrix. For
any variable 2, say, Z lit is the mathematical expectation of Zt t- +s +s
conditional on ~~e information available in period t- 1. Equation (2) is a
very simple aggregate demand equation!( Equation (3) specifies the current
price level, Pt' as a proportional mark-up on the average of the contract
wages in effect during period t. Es~ation (4) is an instantaneous monetary
. 2/
policy response functlon.-
In Taylor's own words, the two key assumptions of the ~lW model are
H(l) wage contracts are staggered, that is, not all wage decisions in the
economy are made at the same time, and (2) when making wage decisions, firms
(and unions) look at the wage rates which are set at other firms and which
will be in effect during their contract period." [Taylor, (1980a, p. 2)J.
It is important to note that the second assumption refers to current multi-
period money wage contract decisions that are made with reference to all other
money wage contracts what will be in effect during the periods covered by the
current contract. While currently contracting firms and unions may well be
interested in their wages relative to those of firms and unions contracting
at earlier and later dates, rational behaviour would seem to require that the
relative real values of these contracts and not the relative money wages per se
should be the proper focus of concern. It can therefore be argued.that Taylor's
RMW model does not isolate the implications of having multi-period non-contingent
(i.e. open-loop) money wage contracts l/ from those of having a form of money
illusion.- 4 -
The RRW model modifies the wage setting process in the following way.
The contract money wage of firms and unions settling in period t, x , is
t
set to achieve a given expected (target) real wage over the duration of ~~e
contract. This expected target real wage depends on expected average excess
demand during the contract interval and on the real wages that are expected
to be achieved by other firms and unions whose contracts overlap with the
period t contract. With N-period contracts, the current contract money wage
is therefore directly dependent on current expectations of the price level
during the current and the following N-l periods. Indirectly, because of
the dependence of the current contract wage on the expected real value of ~~e
contract wages with which it overlaps, the current contract wage will depend
on current expectations of the price level during the next 2N-2 periods.
In general there are three kinds of arguments in the structural equation
for the current contract wage. First, the price expectation effect, which
reflects the influence of the average price level expected over the life of
the contract. This effect is absent in the RMW model. Second, the relative
wage effect, which can be in terms of either real or money wages. Finally,
the demand effect which represents the influence of the average level of
excess demand in the labour market expected over the life of the contract.
Formally, the RRW model retains equations (2) - (5) but replaces (1) by "
1 N-l




















Note that in (6) we specify the expected real contract wage represented
by the money contract wage that is expected to be negotiated in period t + s
1 N-I A
by ~ 11 - N- .LOP 11 .' This is the expectation of the average real t- t+s J= t- t+s+J
wage negotiated by firms and unions contracting in period t + s over the
entire duration of that contract, i.e. from period t + s to period t + s + ~ - 1.
One interpretation of the Taylor ~~~ model is that firms and unions negotiate
not on the basis of the actual and expected values of contracts established
by other firms and unions but on the basis only of those real wages earned
by other workers whilst the currently negotiated contract is in force. Accord-
ing to this interpretation, (6) should be replaced by
1 N-l A
x - - 1: P
t N s=O t-llt+s =
N-l







The two possible interpretations of relative real wages are illustrated in
table 1. In the model of equation (6) firms and unions contracting in period
t interpret the real value of the contract formed in period t + 2 as
AI... ...
x I --(p + P + t-l t+2 3 t-l:t+2 t-llt+3
hand would substitute
P
t 11 ). The model of (7), on the other
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Real wage perceptions of firms and unions contracting during period t
in the RRW oodel [solid rectangles] and the RMW model [dashed rectangles].
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Therefore, if (5) holds, equation (7) is identically equal to equation (1),
the relative money wage equation of the RMW model.
Taylor argues that firms and unions negotiating the current contract wage
look at the contract wages which are set at other firms and will be in effect
during their contract period. If overlapping contract wages matter because of
what they imply for the real standards of living achieved by other workers and
the real wage costs paid by other firms, the RRW model is clearly the appropriate
one.
The solution method for the RRW model is similar to that for the RlviW model
(see Taylor [1980a]), although the algebra is somewhat more involved. From (3)
A 1 N-l A
we see that p 11 k = - ,L x 11 k' and from (2), (3) and (4) that t- t+ N 1=0 t- t+-1
A 13 N-l A ( )
Y I - - L x Substitute these two expressions into 6 to t-l t+s - - N i=O t-llt+s-i·
obtain :
N-l N-l
x _1:.. L L ~ ,1 " =
t N2 j=O i=O t-~t+J-1
+
N,...1 N-l N-l 1 A
L b (x -- L L x ~ " ) s t-s 2, . t- t-S+J-1
5=1 N J=O 1=0
N-l N-l N-l
A 1 A
L b (x 11 --2 1: 1: x 11 " ) 5=1 5 t- t+5 N j=O i=O t- t+5+J-1
(9)




Taking expectations of (9) as of t-l and rearranging yields
N-l N-l N-l N-l
L b x I + L b x I + (l - y/3) L L x I 0 (10)
xt-llt = s=1 s t-l t-s s=l s t-l t+s N2 s=o i=O t-l t+s-~
1 N-l N-l N-l A 1 N-l N-l N-l ~
- -2 L b L LXII ' 0 - -2 L b L L xt 11' o.
N 1 s. 0 t- t-s+J-~ s. 0 - t+S+J-~ s= J=O ~=O N s=1 J=O ~=O
Like Taylor we use the following identity
N-l N-l 1 A
- L L x I .
N2 s=o i=O t-l t+s-~
(11)
Equation (10) becomes
.... ( 1 - /3y I ~ N-l £ x I 1 - ( )j = 1 + (1 - l3y) (-)-- t-l t N N N
N-l ....
E b x I s t-l t-s s=1
N-1







E L b b,x I '
5=1 j=l S J t-l t-5+J
N-1 N-1
L E b b.x 11 0
5=1 j=l 5 J t- t+5-J
N-1 N-l
E E b box 11 0
o 5 J t- . t-5-J
5=1 J=1
N-1 N-1
E E b box 11 .
5=1 j=l 5 J t- t+5+J- 9
Equation (12) can be written as
where, as we show in the appendix, the B. are given by 1.
2 2





= - N-l «2 _ 0 )b - ~~-l-sb.b ~s-lb b) 1 N 1 N ~y s 1.=1 1. s+i - i=l i s-i ' s = , ... , - (14b)
B = B = N-l (~N-l b b )
s -s N i=s-N+l i s-i
s = N, ••• , 2N - 2 (14c)
Using well-known formulae, the summations in (14b) and (14c) yield third order
polynomials in s. When the summations run from a larger to a smaller number
in (14b) we take the terms to vanish.
The following points are worth noting. Firstly, BO is always positive
for positive Sy. This can be contrasted with Taylor's model. Second, in
and
[1980a] .
(14c) B is always positive and independent of By. Third, in (14b) B is a
s s
function of BYi since the terms in the summation signs are all non-negative
these B will all change sign for some sufficient large value of By, which will
s
in general be different for different s.
Equation (13) can now be solved using the method presented in Taylor
s 2N-2 s'
Let L x =xt and define the polynomial B(L) =. ~ (2 2)B L , where B
t -s s=- N- s 0
B = B s=1,2,••• ,2N-2 are as in (l4a-c). Equation (13) can now be rewritten s -s, ,
as- 10 -
Because of its symmetry B(L) can be factored as in (16)
(15)
B(L) = (16)






A unique rational expectations solution to (15) is obtained by choosing the
polynomial A(L) that corresponds to the unstable roots of B(L). With this
choice of A(L) we can divide (15) by AA(L-l ). This yields:
A(L) Xt-ll t = 0 (18)
A rational expectations reduced form stochastic difference equation for xt ' the
contract wage, is therefore given by
= (19)







a a u u+s s=O,l,2, ... , 2N-2. (20)- 11 -
It is instructive to compare the behaviour of our RRW model with that of
Taylor's ~M model, for identical values of all parameters, including contract
length. This will serve to bring out the separate contributions of money
illusion and "nominal inertia" due to overlapping, staggered non-contingent
money wage contracts.
The reduced form solution for the contract wage in the N-period ~RW model
(equations (l4a - c), (19) and (20» differs dramatically from the corresponding
solution to Taylor's RHW model. The analogue to (13) in the m1W model is :
where
N-l N-l







- - B = B = b s -s s
s = I, ... , N-l (22b)
Using the same approach as in equations (15) - (20) ,we get
= (23)





- s a L s
(24)
The a , S = 1, ••• , N-l are found by solving the N equations







s=0,1,2, •.. , N-l (25)
- where the B are defined in (22a, b).
s
Thus with N-period contracts, the RRW model yields a 2N-2 order stochastic
difference equation in the contract wage while Taylor's ID1W model yields an
N-l order stochastic difference equation in the contract wage. Further
differences between the two models become apparent when we consider some
explicit numerical solutions for the two models. This is done in the next
section. In the RRW model, as in the RMW model, the variance of output and of
the price level is a function of the monetary policy parameter B.
3. Some numerical solutions of the relative real wage model and the relative
money wage model
Consider the two-period contract case, N=2. TaylorIS RMW model yields a
first order stochastic difference equation in the contract wage
= (25)
-a = 1+ .SyB _/(1+ .SYB)2 _ 1
1 1- .SyB 1 - .SyB
Table 2 indicates how - 0 1 varies as By is increased from o. By = 0 represents
the case when the real money supply is always kept constant; equiproportional
nominal money supply changes accommodate deviations of the price level from
its equilibrium value. By < 0 would represent policies to expand the real
money supply whenever the price level increases. No real solution exists for- 13 -
such policies. Sy > 0 means that the nominal money supply is expanded less
than proportionately (or even contracted if S > 1) when the price level
the lagged contract wage, is positive for 0 ~ Sy <
N-l
increases so that the real money supply declines. -al~ the coefficient on
N
2 and negative for
N-l
Sy > ~. It declines monotonically as Sy increases and approaches -1 as
Sy -+ + 00
With N = 2, the RRW model yields a second order stochastic difference
equation in the contract wage.


















































vary with Sy. The model exhibits borderline or
neutral stability with Sy = 0 and in the limit as SY ~ 00 The coefficient on
x 1 declines from 2 when Sy = 0 to -1 when SY ~ 00 t- The coefficient on x 2
t-
starts at -1 when Sy = 0 and rises monotonically to 0 when By ~ 00. This
behaviour is clearly qualitatively different from that exhibited by the Rl·;\';
model with the same contract length. It is also qualitatively different fr0~
the second order difference equation generated by the P~W model when N= 3.
This case is described by equations (29) - (31) and by Table 4.
x
t
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In the RMW model with N=3, both the coefficients on x land on x 2 are positive
t- t-
and decline monotonically towards zero as Sy increases from 0 to 1.5. Both
coefficients are negative for Sy > 1.5 and tend asymptotically to -1 as SY > 00
This pattern holds generally : as Sy increases the coefficients on all lagged
N
values of the contract wage change sign at Sy = --- and tend to -1 as Sytends to . N-l








areTl\BLE 3 The cont:ract wage Q(luat.ion in the lU{v-l mod(~l, N == 2
Sy = 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0 2.0 10.0 100. +00
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either both positive (for Sy < 1.5) or both negative (for Sf > 1.5). If 3, < 1.5,
a higher value of xt will be associated with higher money wage settlements in
all subsequent periods, through the relative (money) wage effect. If policy is
more restrictive (Sy > 1.5), the demand effect dominates the relative wage
effect and a higher value of xt leads through expectations of monetary contrac-
tion and consequent excess supply of labour to lower wage settlements in sub-
sequent periods.
In the RRW model with N= 2 the coefficient on xt _2 is ahmys negative. The
reason is that higher wage contracts formed between t - (2N - 2) and t - N raise
the price level in the periods between t - (N - 1) and t - 1. The real value of
contracts negotiated between t - (N - 1) and (t - 1), which overlap with the one
formed in period t, will therefore be lower. Via the relative real wage effect
this will lower xt •
The coefficient on x 1 changes from positive to negative at Sy = 2 as Sy t-
increases. A higher value of past overlapping contract wages (in general
Xt -N+I ' •.• , xt - l and with N=2 only xt - l ) raises xt via the relative real wage
effect.~ By raising Pt' a higher value of xt - l will further raise xt via the
price expectation effect. For large enough values of Sy (Sy > 2 if N= 2) the




can be dominated by a negative demand effect.
In general, the coefficients on lagged contract wages, x
t
_s ' tend as. SY -+ +ClO
to -1 for I ~ s ~ N-l and to 0 for N ~ s ~ 2N-2.21 We expect the coefficients
on xt-(2N-2)' ••• , xt _N to be negative for all finite positive values of Sy ~I




' ..• , x
t
_l to be positive for small values of
Sy, and negative for large values of Sy.- 19 -
4. Staggered wage contracts \·:ithout relative ,,,age effects
In this section we exa~ine the money and real wage ~odels when
Taylor's second key ass~~ption is removed. That is, when the bargaining
process does not take into account relative wages. This corresponds to
the special case of the wage equations in (1) and (6) when d = d = o. s -s
It enables us to separate the consequences of having relative wage effects
from those of having staggered, overlapping contracts pe2' se.
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--L. bx + +--L. bx
N s=l s t-1It-s N N s=l s t-l!t+s
= I
N- 1 " IN- 1 " b x + b x
s=l s t-1jt-s s=l s t-llt+s
(34)
We can solve equation (34) exactly as before. Table 5 presents the lag
weights on the resulting stochastic difference equation for N = 2, 3 and




















































In the money wage model without relative wage effects, less accQ~Qdati~g
policy (that is, larger values of ey) ir~reases the dependence of current
wages on past wages, as reflected in the larger absolute values of t::e
(negative) lag coefficients. The behaviour of Taylor's m.r:., model is sicilar
to that of the money wage model without relative wage effects, when the demand
effect dominates, that is for large values of By. For small values of 3y
the relative wage effect dominates the demand effect in Taylor's cc~el ar.d
the dependence of current wages on past wages diminishes as By increases
-1
from zero to N(N-l) . This behaviour can be seen clearly in Tables 2) 4)
and 5).
In the real wage model we can similarly disentangle the demand effect
from the relative real wage effect and the price expectation effect. In
equation (6) we set d = d = 0, which gives s -8
Substituting for expected demand we have
(35)
(36)
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= \,N-1 + \'N-1
L bx I L bx' I s=l s t-1 t-s s=1 s t-1,t+s (37)- 22 -
Comparing this with the equivalent expression in the ~·lW model (21, 22a, 22b)
we can see that the equations are identical when By in this model takes a
-1 -1
value (N-l) N times that in the fU.ltv model. This means that policy is N(N-l)
times more effective in this model than it is in the ffi1W model, but that
otherwise they are identical.
The only way to distinguish empirically between the money wage model "ith
relative wage effects and the real wage model without relative wage effects is
by knowing By and ~ £ priori. Otherwise the two models are observationally
equivalent.
It has already been shown (Phelps and Taylor [1977], Fischer [1977]) that
in order to obtain the conclusion that kno~TI monetary policy rules affect real
output, it is sufficient to have multi-period non-contingent money wage (or
price) contracts. It is neither essential to have relative wage effects nor
for contracts to be staggered. Different policy rules will have different
effects whenever the money stock can be made to respond to new information before all
private agents can revise wage contracts. To include such features as relative
wage effects and staggered contracts may of course be desirable for its c~n sa~e
because it captures an essential feature of reality.- 23 -
5. Some empirical implications of the relative real \·;s.ge r;.odel
The RRW model and the ill1W model have some directly testable implications
even if the contract wage cannot be observed. From the price level equatio~
(3) we see that, if N= 2, the price equation of the ill·ll'; model is the ARUlA
(1, 1) process
-alP.t-l + ~~ + ~E -t t-l
with -1 ~ -al
~ 1.
With N= 2, the price equation of the RRW model is the ARIH.'\ (2,2) process
with -1 ~ -al




The price equation for the ill1W model with N= 3 is also an ARIHA (2, 2) process
Given a priori knowledge of N, we can test the RRW hypothesis that the
(38c)
price data follow an ARIMA (2N-2, 2N-2) process against the ill1W hypothesis test
that the price data follow an ARlMA (N-l, N-l) process. It is much less
straightforward to include in these tests the inequality constraints on the a
i
and a. coefficients shown for N= 2 in (38b) and (38c). Alternatively, without
~
prior knowledge of N, we can select the best-fitting ARIMA (i, i) process
(i ~ 1) for the price data. If i = 1 and the other restrictions of (38a) are- 24 -
not rejected by the data, the Pl·::·; model is consistent ',-,ith the data and the
RRlv model is not. If i > l, non-r;ested hypothesis tests are in general
required to discriminate bet'lieen the R2,'; and the RI1~1 model on the basis of
inequality constraints sl;ch as those given in (38b) and (38c). However,
finding a positive coefficient for the longest lag on Pt is always inco~siste~t
with the RR\'; ;;;00.021 and fi~o.ing ccefficients "lith different signs is al'da1's
inconsistent with the Pl·1:'; r.:odel. Taylor, in his empirical ·,,;or.-c on the 2·11v
model (see specifically Taylor [1.930bJ but also 'l'aylor [1979b]) uses t.:18 N= 2
version of the ,node1 , which yields the ARI:'l]'" (1, 1) process of equation (3Ba).
This equation could never have been generated by the RRW model 'lihich ah;ays
yields at least an .'\RIN.'\ (2, 2) ?rocess for the general price level. In the
most direct test of the ?l.I\';' r::odel (Taylor [1930b]) \,'ith N=2, it is fou-'1d




follo;,,, a first order !.;A
process. It is, in principle, al~vays undesirable to have to attribute syste-
matic explanatory power to the disturbance terms of a model. In this case,
however, one might go further and argue that equation (38a) with an ~l; (1)
process for E:
t
may well be a misspecification that should be tested against
(38b), the RRI'l model ,vith N = 2, or against (38c), the R.."IW model with N= 3,
both with i.i.d. E:
t
. To perform these and other empirical tests of the two
models is a priority for future research.- 25 -
6. Conclusions
The RRW model we developed as an alternative to Taylor's ~~~ model differs
from the latter in one important respect. Taylor's RHH model vie"\vs the money
wage decision of firms and unions contracting in a given period as influenced
by the money "\vage rates set (or expecLed to be set) by other firms and unions
that will be in effect during their O\oJn contract period. The RR\{ model views
current wage bargainers as attempting to achieve a real wage target over the
life of their contract that is influenced by the real wages achieved or expected
to be achieved by those other wage bargainers with whose contract periods there
is some degree of overlap.
Quite significant differences in behaviour are exhibited in otherwise
identical RRW and RN'i\' models. With N-period contracts, the RRh' model yields a
2N-2 order stochastic difference equation for the contract wage and an ARI}~
(2~-2, 2~-2) process for the general price level. The corresponding ~~ model
yields an :~-l order stochastic difference equation for the contract wage and an
ARUL-\ (~-l, N-l) process for the general price level. ~\ith the ~n~ model the
coefficients on lagged contract wages in the contract wage equation always
have a common sign and decline both in the order of the lag and with the degree
of non-accommodation of monetary policy. The lag coefficients in the RRW model
will generally have mixed signs. It was also shown that Taylor's &~ model is
observationally equivalent to a real wage model without relative wage effects.
What is perhaps the major qualitative conclusion of Taylor's RlM model is
not affected, however. This is that rational expectations combined with nominal
inertia due, e.g. to overlapping, staggered,non-contingent money wage contracts
leaves scope for known contingent monetary policy rules to influence such real
variables as the variance of output.-26-
FOOTNOTES
1. The simplest interpretation of (2) is that of the quantity theory equation
of exchange with the (logarithm of the) income velocity of circulation
represented by a white noise disturbance term vt
2. In Taylor I S P..:.'i\'i rr:odel, as in the R..:~W model specified belo',.;, outpu·t '.-:auld
be affected by lagged monetary feedback as \vell (e.g. 1:lt = 8Pt-l) . U;1less
the policy rule is "syrr.rnetric in time" (e.g. mt = OPt_l
+ (l-I3)~ T o~ , )
.t-'t Pt - lit+l
the simple algebraic structure of the R"'1W model and the ?~'(;'i model is lost
because the polynomial equation in the expected contract wage is no longer
symmetric.
3. The non-contingen~ nature of these contracts means that the N-period wage
contract negotiated in period t does not make the wages paid under the
contract in periods t + 1, ••• , t + N - 1 contingent on ir.fcr::ation (on future
contract wages, future prices and future excess demands) that may become
available during the life of the contract. If a multi-period contract made
the money wages paid over the life of the contract contingent on future
information, it would be equivalent to a sequence of single-period contracts.
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L j=O Pt - l !t+s+j =
- 27-
N-l-sA




L 5=1 L j=O Pt-l!t+j =
N-l N-l A
L 5=1 L j=sPt-llt +j
N-2 A




the identity is easily established.
N




taking the limit as SY + N-l yields Xt-ll t = O. Therefore xt = £t is a
solution.
-1
Again from (22a) B
O
goes to (N - 1) as By goes to +00. By direct substitu-
tion it can be checked that as
-1
(Note that A = [(N - l)N] ).
1, s = 1, ..., N - 1, satisfies (25).
6. The increase in the period t - 1 real wage will (due to the dependence of
prices on wages) be less than the increase in the period t - 1 nominal wage.
a a u u+s
7. From equations (14a, b,
1
, B










~m s N- s
c) we get Sy+oo(B) = N for 1 ~ s ~ N - 1 and
o
2N-2. Pividing (20) by B
O
we get.
s = 1, ••• I 2N-2 •-28 -
Taking the limit as Sr + ~ this reduces to
ex ex u u+s



















s = N, •.. , 2N-2









8. It is obviou5tl~tth€coefficienton xt - 2N+2 is always negative for finite
positive Sr.-29-
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APPENDIX
In this appendix we show that equation (13), with the B. as given in
J
(14a,b, c), is equivalent to equation (12). Except for rearrangement we only
have to determine the coefficients of x I '~l/ ,for r = 0, •.• , 2N-2, t-l t+r t- t-r
in the bilinear forms on the right hand side of equation (12). There are four
such bilinear forms but by symmetry we need only consider two cases. The
problem, then, is to find K and M such that (AI) and (A2) hold :
r r
( ~N-l~N-l b b A ~N-l~N-l b b A =




I.os -_1 . 1 b b.x. 11 t +' J= S J 1:- -s J
2N-2
= Er =2 (A2)
Consider (Al) first. In this equation we have
j = s+r (A3)
The fact that j takes values only between 1 and N- 1 means that, for r ~ 0, s
is constrained to taking the values between 1 and N- 1 - r. For each s in this
domain we have a corresponding j (given by (A3» and a value for b.b , the sum
J. s
of all these (multiplied by 2) is the coefficient of x I . t-l t+r
Hence
K =K
-r r r=O, ••• , N-2 (A4)-31 -
Because of the linearity of b k in k we can easily carry out the summation in





K = Li=l 2
r [N(N-l)j





Now using the following identities
N-l-r
Li=l N(N-r) - (N-l-r) N(N-r)
N-l-r





= %(N-l- r) (N- r) (2N- 2r-l)
K = K = -r r
And in particular,
(N - 1 - r) (N - r) (2N + r - 1)
6[N (N - 1) ] 2
r=O, .•. , N-2 . (AS)
=
2N - 1
6N (N - 1)
(A6)
Now we deal with (A2).
for which
s+j = r
Proceeding as before, M is the sum of the series b b.
r s J
(A7)
and both s and j lie between 1 and N - 1. Hence,
and
l~s=r-j~N-l =>r-N+l~j~r-l- 32-
The upper and lower bounds on j depend on the value of r. There are two cases
2 ~ r ~ N- 1 , in which case j lies between 1 and r - 1 (I)
2N - 2 ~ r ~ N
Therefore,
in which case j lies between r - N+ 1 and N- 1 . (II)
r-l b.b r =2, N-l (A8) M = M = E . 1 ..., -r r J= J r-j
N-l b.b 2~- 2 (A9) M = M = £: . 1 r = N, ..., -r r J=r-N+ J r-j
We can now write equation (12) as
N-I E2N-2M x - N-I EN-l(2_e)b +K +M ]~
N s=N -s t-l!t-s N s=l Y s -s -s t-llt-s
(AlO)
N-l 2N-2 A
+-E Mx I N s=N s t-l t+s = 0
Here • as in the text, we adopt the convention that, when a summation runs
from a smaller to a larger number, the term vanishes. Substituting (AS, ••. ,9)
in equation (AlO) and comparing with equation (13) gives (14a, ••• , c).